Technically, I’m still not running “good” — I’m guessing it will take my EV graph months to hopefully eventually converge back to 0 (yes, it’s that much in the red).  But aside from that, I’ve had a good string of sessions in the past two or three days.  7 of the last 8, and 14 of the last 19.  Pretty solid!  I think that there have been some contributing factors:

1. Opening up in position and tightening up out of position.
2. Playing more hands in position against players who play poorly post flop.
3. Getting to showdown more against bad, bluffy players.
4. Playing more aggressively pre-flop: punishing the limpers (especially in position) and 3-betting more (especially in position).
5. C-betting and double-barreling with reason: because I have a hand, because I can represent a hand, because my opponent is likely to fold regardless, or because my opponent can’t represent a hand.

Most surprising is that, for whatever reason, my redline (non-showdown winnings) was about steady over the course of my 4.5 hours of play today.  I want to bring up one tough hand from the day:

Pre Flop: ($0.75) Hero is UTG with K K

Hero raises to $1.50, 1 fold, CO calls $1.50, BTN calls $1.50, SB calls $1.25, BB calls $1

Flop: ($7.50) 5 4 A (5 players)

SB checks, BB bets $0.50, Hero raises to $5.50, CO calls $5.50, BTN folds, SB folds, BB folds

My thinking was as such: this weak lead means the BB has a polarized range, either a monster like AK or something like a flush draw (I see the min-bet donk when drawing out of position all the time), so I definitely want to raise him to see where I am.  Likewise, a raise could serve the purpose of folding out an ace behind me; if someone cold calls a bet and a raise, that also helps me limit their range.

Turn: ($19.00) 4 (2 players)

Hero bets $12, CO calls $12

Now, out of position against the cold caller, I have a tough bet to make.  I am certainly representing AK.  He is representing either a monster made hand that he’s slow-playing, or a flush draw.  This guy was a TAGgy player, around 24/19 over a good sample, IIRC.  I made a bet big enough to fold out a fold draw and probably to fold out hands like AQ and AJ, considering how I played it.

River: ($43.00) 7 (2 players)

Hero checks, CO bets $25, Hero requests TIME, Hero folds

So, this guy called the turn bet.  I can’t imagine he was on a flush draw.  And if he was, considering what I represented, I can’t imagine he’d bet the river (he would have to believe that I would be calling with AK here).  That leaves but one option: that he flopped a monster.  In fact, if I were him, and I flopped a set of 5s or 4s, that’s exactly how I would play it as well.  Getting under 3-to-1, I don’t think I’m good 25% of the time here — I just don’t think that he’s bluffing with a missed flush draw that much, or really at all.  I folded, and I’m pretty sure it was the right thing to do.

Only had about an hour or two to play today, as I had a job interview in the morning, and tickets to see the Orioles play at the new Yankee Stadium in the evening.  I played my normal style: stupid aggro at first, and then settling down and playing a thinking game as time progresses.  I don’t know why I always do this, maybe it’s just the childish excitement of sitting down at a poker table for the first time in any given day.  Regardless, this one hand made me sick.

The small blind did have some history with me, and he had 3-bet me before.

Preflop: Hero is MP with K, 10
1 fold, Hero bets $1.50, Button calls $1.50, SB raises to $7, 1 fold, Hero calls $5.50, 1 fold

All right, so I’m not thrilled with my call here, in hindsight.  Sure, it looked like a great squeeze situation from his perspective.  He knows I have a wide range in the CO, and knows that the button is calling very loose (39/22 player).  Then again, I know that he doesn’t mind 3-betting, and also that he c-bets too often, and that I have position.  So many not too bad a spot to call a 3-bet.

Flop: ($16) 4, 8, K (2 players)
SB bets $10, Hero calls $10

Here’s big mistake #1.  Not that I shouldn’t have called, but I didn’t even think about it.  My thought process should have been: What hands could he have here?  Other than AK, AA and KK, everything else in his range (call it AJs+, AQ+, 88+) missed.  But it’s not that simple.  If I call here, I will be committing myself to the pot (certainly if a non-heart, non-ace bricks off on the turn), as there will only be one pot-sized bet left.  I didn’t think about any of these things.

Turn: ($36) 2 (2 players)
SB bets $36, Hero calls $33 (All-In)

This is even worse.  I remember thinking to myself, “OK, well I guess I’ll have to get lucky,” and then clicking on the call button.  WTF!?  That was RETARDED.  If I didn’t think I had the best hand, or had enough equity in the pot, getting slightly better than 2-to-1, to make the call, then I shouldn’t have made it.  But I didn’t think about if he was capable of a bluff, a semi-bluff, or doing this with an underpair.  Instead, I just called without thinking.

River: ($102) 6 (2 players, 1 all-in)

Total pot: $102 | Rake: $3

Do I need to tell you what happened?  I got lucky.  He had AJs and missed his flush and his overcard.  Figures: I play like shit, and win.  When I play well, I get drawn out on, rivered and otherwise abused.  I’m pissed because I deserved to be taught a lesson for playing poorly, but for whatever reason the poker gods looked favorably upon me today.  If I don’t learn my lesson, I’ll only repeat my mistakes.  I look forward to calling my stack off with top-pair-mediocre-kicker sometime in the future for what will then hopefully be the last time ever.

A recent focus has been improving my “red line” — the line on the graph (in both PT3 and HEM) that shows your non-showdown winnings.  Or, in the case of me and many others, your non-showdown losses.  For a long time, I totally neglected this, until watching Zaitsev’s “Myth of the Redline” 2-part video series on Cardrunners.  After looking at his graph (up slightly), and comparing it with mine (down drastically), I realized that whatever was contributing to it was a big leak in my game.  In fact, in about13k hands, I was down about 1800BB from hands that never went to showdown.  I figured this could mean a few things:

1. I was folding too many hands that I should have gotten to showdown.
2. I was pumping too much money into pots that I ultimately would end up folding.
3. I was missing opportunities to win pots without a showdown (either by stealing them, or by value-betting the river more, which will lead to some more folds).

I’ve taken most of Zaitsev’s advice: tighten up a little, 3-bet a little less, think about hand ranges and perceived hand ranges, c-bet less, and use position to exploit players who c-bet too much.  This last item in particular was important, as I often failed to look at the relevant c-bet stat that was right in front of my face.  The results have been good so far: not including a session where I played like a total crazy donk, I’m down only about 520BB in non-showdown hands in my past 10k.  Clearly, I’d like to have a red-line with a positive slope, like Zaitsev, but I know it will take more work.  In the meantime, it’s been good to set out to work on something specific and see pretty clear and immediate results.  I think that I will watch both of the videos again later this week and see if I can’t take the next step before moving on to the next problem with my game.

I’m starting this blog solely for my own use, but if others find it useful, then more power to them.  I often find myself going in circles when it comes to own my poker learning, so I think it would be beneficial to have a “poker diary” of sorts that I can re-visit.  It’s also therapeutic to be able to put your thought and feelings in writing–too often, this comes in the form of e-mailing or IMing a friend, who undoubtedly couldn’t care less about your bad beat.

So, without further adieu, and without any background or history, here we go.